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Abstract—Current day software development relies heavily on
the use of service architectures and on agile iterative development
methods to design, implement, and deploy systems. These prac-
tices result in systems made up of multiple services that introduce
new data flows and evolving designs that escape the control of a
single designer. Academic privacy engineering literature typically
abstracts away such conditions of software production in order to
achieve generalizable results. Yet, through a systematic study of
the literature, we show that proposed solutions inevitably make
assumptions about software architectures, development methods
and scope of designer control that are misaligned with current
practices. These misalignments are likely to pose an obstacle
to operationalizing privacy engineering solutions in the wild.
Specifically, we identify important limitations in the approaches
that researchers take to design and evaluate privacy enhancing
technologies which ripple to proposals for privacy engineering
methodologies. Based on our analysis, we delineate research
and actions needed to re-align research with practice, changes
that serve a precondition for the operationalization of academic
privacy results in common software engineering practices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of data-driven services brought with it a wave of
consciousness about their impact on privacy. This is reflected
in the strengthening of legal frameworks for privacy protec-
tion [31], and in the increased efforts to develop standards fo-
cused on building privacy-preserving systems [15]. Academic
circles have echoed this trend with an unprecedented number
of papers on privacy technologies at prominent security, pri-
vacy, and systems conferences, and with satellite events on
privacy engineering at comparable venues [37], [60].
Academic work on privacy technology and engineering
efforts have multiplied. However, they are difficult to translate
to current-day software systems. While some of the translation
challenges are due to the lack of economic, legal, and political
incentives, we argue that they are also technical. In this paper,
we show that across the board, current privacy research is
not attuned to the widespread use of service architectures in
combination with agile methods [47], [56]. Even when orga-
nizations and developers are willing to operationalize privacy
research, there is a misalignment between proposed solutions
and development practices that is difficult to overcome for
both privacy researchers and software engineers. To illustrate
the misalignment, let us consider the problem of privacy-
preserving billing of pay-per-use services, e.g., usage of roads
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Fig. 1. Privacy-preserving billing: research view vs. software practice.
Legend: is a development team. is the device that communicates with
the System, mi is the measurements from the device, id is the id to identify
the device. Grey elements are outside of the control of the main dev team,
whereas black elements indicates what is under their control.
[20], electricity [80], or public transportation [58], whereby a
provider can bill clients depending on usage without learning
fine-grained patterns.
When modeling, privacy literature typically abstracts the
system to a set of users, whose devices record usage measure-
ments, and a provider that takes as input the measurements
and computes a bill that is then sent to the users for payment
using information stored in a client database. This system
model is shown in Figure 1, left. This model assumes that: (i)
there is a single development team, and (ii) both the privacy-
preserving computation engine (compute) and the client
database (store) are implemented in-house by a service
provider, i.e., under the control of a single entity.
However, under the current reality of software engineering,
the system implementation is likely to be very different. First,
the provider development team is unlikely to implement the
service as a software monolith. Instead, the service provider
typically uses (third-party) services to cut on costs, such
as development, in-house expertise, or maintenance cost. In
our example, the storage of client data, as well as the bill
computations would be outsourced to specialized services (see
Figure 1, center and right). Each of these services, and the
code used to compose them, are developed independently
by different teams. Once the APIs are settled, the service
implementations can also evolve without coordination.
This change in the architecture and in the development
teams radically changes the environment in which privacy
engineering, and privacy technologies, must operate. Among
others, the introduction of services introduces new data flows
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and entities out of the control of the privacy engineer, which
impacts the system threat model that designers can assume.
The shift from sequentially executed waterfall development
processes towards iterative agile methodologies in which sys-
tem goals and implementations continuously change to address
new requirements further complicates the settings of privacy
efforts. This ‘moving target’ poses a challenge for privacy
designs and engineering frameworks that typically assume
static system specifications, and rarely evaluate the impact that
changes in the system have on the privacy guarantees their
solutions provide.
We study this misalignment by conducting a systematic
analysis of literature on privacy technologies and privacy
engineering methodologies. We identify and formulate the
points of friction between privacy engineering methodologies
and privacy technologies that stem from researchers’ implicit
conceptions of software engineering and current software
development practices. We find that privacy researchers sys-
tematically treat engineering as a black box, consequently
failing to address these challenges, and how these challenges
impact the feasibility of operationalizing solutions coming out
of their research.
A problem with these blindspots is that they cast challenges
that arise out of development practices as problems to be
solved by software developers. This neglects that engineering
activities and software production environments raise signif-
icant challenges to the adequacy, feasibility, and potential
deployment of any privacy research proposal: if the available
know-how does not address these challenges, neither can
software developers. Hence, studying the problems that arise
at the intersection between privacy research and software
engineering is of substantial value for the potential impact
and of research interest for the questions that are open to the
field.
We end with a discussion that provides a broader view
of how we got here and on possible ways forward, laying
down a research agenda informed by the conducted analysis.
We consider legitimate differences but also avoidable gaps
between computer science and engineering and across sub-
disciplines of computer science, and how these percolate
to privacy engineering standards making. We also turn the
question around and ask how software production may have
to change, if we want systems that respect people’s privacy.
In fact, we find that for the wide deployment of privacy-
preserving systems, regulation, standards, software industry
and software engineering practices also need to evolve to
account for the challenges we identify. We conclude by
identifying low-hanging fruits that could help bring privacy
research closer to practice.
II. THE AGILE AND SERVICES SHIFT
Innovation, economic incentives, new tools, as well as the
spread of software to new domains continuously changes the
software industry and the way in which software is produced.
We focus on two major shifts that have shaped software
engineering over the last three decades: namely, the shifts
(1) from waterfall to agile methodologies in the development
of software, and (2) from monolithic to service architectures
in the design of software. The two have come to redefine
the industry, its economic models, but also its relationship to
(personal) data, risk, and responsibility [47].
A. Services
Services enable independent development, deployment and
evolution [102]. Service-oriented architectures make it easier
for applications to use services to connect and cooperate within
or outside an enterprise. Application providers can rapidly
extend functionality by integrating additional services and
can also offer their services to external applications. Services
are seen as “a means of delivering value to customers by
facilitating outcomes customers want to achieve without the
ownership of specific costs and risks” [12]. This belief in
services being low-risk and high-value is paradigmatic for the
service-oriented world. Thus, businesses can respond to market
and environmental changes without owning costs and risks –
in other words, services offer business agility. We can trace
this to Conway’s law that states that the architecture of IT
systems reflects the structure of the organization that designs
the system [33]. Hence, organizational structure and software
architecture co-evolve: independent teams produce specialized
independent services.
A service is an overloaded term. In this paper, we use
the service-oriented computing definition: services are “self-
describing, platform-agnostic computational elements that
support rapid, low-cost composition of distributed applica-
tions” [74]. The service provider publishes a description of
their services (an Application Programming Interface, API
specification) and a service consumer discovers and calls the
services through their API [74]. The service provider and
the service consumer are two independent actors. Services
can be arbitrarily small, including concepts such as microser-
vices [41], or serverless computing [21].
Software applications codify certain logic that operates on
data created within or outside the application. Traditionally,
applications have held the execution logic (what function is
called when in the form of instructions) and the data flows
(what data go where) in one place. This type of software
architecture, or code organization, is now called a mono-
lithic architecture. Even though monolithic applications may
also use modularization (logical organization of the code in
smaller independent packages, or modules), services introduce
an additional degree of separation and specialization of the
modules into distributed and independent computational ele-
ments deployed outside of the boundary and control of the
main application. Service-oriented architectures not only split
logically the application execution logic and the data flows
but also distribute them across a computational infrastructure
into services and a service composition layer [74], [53], [75].
The service composition layer is responsible for composition,
monitoring, conformance, and quality-of-service of services.
The two established ways for composition of services into
an application are orchestration and choreography [29], which
determine how much of the execution logic and data flows
the services have. The service composition layer can keep all
the logic and orchestrate the use of different services (e.g., an
enterprise service bus) [74] as in Figure 1, center, where the
System sends and requests data from store and compute
but fully controls the execution flow; or the logic is split
among ‘smart’ services that coordinate between themselves, in
Figure 1, right, the System dispatches requests to the store
and compute, who also connect with each other and the client
without intervention from the system.
B. Agile Development
In the 1980s and the 1990s, programmers started proposing
more lightweight models as an alternative to the sequential
development process used until then that is known as waterfall
development. The traditional waterfall process consists of
six phases – specification, design, development, verification,
deployment, maintenance – executed in order. The new wave
of agile methodologies countered this by welcoming change to
come at anytime while delivering small increments of working
software before all else. For example, agile methods have “no
big design” ethos, employ iterative development, and focus
on customer-centered engineering of functionality [23]. We
shorthand these methods as agile inspired by the “Manifesto
for Agile Software Development” [23]. Figure 2 depicts the
transition from waterfall to agile software development.
The manifesto underlines a no big design up front attitude
[23]. It proposes to produce working software in short itera-
tions (weeks, or even multiple times a day), in greater simplic-
ity (always do the simplest thing that could possibly work and
no more than what you need right now), and continuous code
reviews [44]. The phases from design, development,
verification, and deployment that in Figure 2, left,
happen only once, are repeated every iteration and for
all services. This leads to increased emphasis on modularity,
incremental design, iterations in feature development that are
open to changing requirements from the side of the
business domain, and continuous deployment, i.e., releasing
code as frequently as possible. Thus, the business teams
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Fig. 2. From Waterfall to Agile Development. : a change from either a new
version of a integrated service or from a business request, : an iteration that
delivers a new version. is a development team.
on the right of Figure 2 of every software (either representa-
tives of the customer, or the customer) can request a change
or a new feature regardless of the stage of development.
The continuous iterations, the limited scope of each pro-
duced software unit, and the modularized design enables the
use of software that other teams engineer and enhances the use
of service-oriented architectures; the software architecture is
intertwined with the way software is produced. The three agile
development teams in Figure 2 work independently and
produce the system and the compute, store services
that interact with the each other through their interfaces.
This change in the teams’ composition entails a lack of end-
to-end control over the system design, as other teams are
responsible for the implementation behind the interfaces. The
teams’ development cycles are independent. A new increment
of the system might be deployed every two weeks, whereas
the store might be delivering a new version every week or
every day. A change in the clients domain of each service
might trigger a change in the other services that ripples as a
change to the systems and services using it. Thus, a change
might be triggered by a new version of a service integrated in
a system, not only from a client’s request.
Agile methods are as much about development efficiency
as they are about the success of software-based businesses.
Besides enabling customer centricity, agile methods promise
to give companies control over the costs of maintenance, mon-
itoring, and support. Users benefit from continuous updates
instead of waiting for the release of new versions giving a big
advantage in an industry where 60 percent of software costs
are for maintenance, and of those costs 60 percent are for
adding new functionality to legacy software [44].
C. Development and Operations (DevOps)
DevOps, a term coined by combining software development
and information-technology operations, has become a common
practice in agile service-oriented software engineering to opti-
mize and automate the software development process pipeline.
DevOps is characterized by a set of activities from the software
development process that are being automated such as builds
(from source code to a compiled version), tests (checking the
conformance of new changes against a set of tests), continuous
integration (integrating individual developers’ changes into
a single shared repository), continuous delivery (preparing
new software versions that can be released), and continuous
deployment (deploying new versions of the software). DevOps
enables speedy development and deployment of new software
versions with little to no engineering overhead due to the
adjustable increased level of automation. DevOps and experi-
mental practices such as A/B testing, dark launches, or feature
toggles [3], and canary testing [2] reinforce each other. These
experimental practices make use of the multiple versions of
the software that can be deployed to monitor and optimize
performance indicators, i.e., clicks from users, usage pattern
detection, system optimizations. Services expose only an API
to its users and thus, the many data flows and the multiple
versions of the services generated through the experimental
practices remain invisible from any external point of view.
The implications for privacy engineering stem from the lack
of coordination and control over the data flows that may
potentially lead to data leakage and linking.
D. Terminology
In the reminder of this paper, we use the following ter-
minology. We use the term service to signify a service or a
microservice, in the sense of a small computational element.
A monolith is a software architecture that does not depend
on externally deployed services. Service architecture is a
split codebase composed of services and a service composition
layer. A context is the portion of the execution logic and data
flows of the system to which services have access to. Control
expresses the level of oversight that a system designer has
over the logic and data distribution of their systems, from
full control on the execution logic and codebase in monolith,
to partial control on both in service architectures. Waterfall
is a sequential software development process without loops
between stages. Iterative development indicates that the de-
velopment process is conducted in steps that can be repeated
without a constraint from which step to loop back to which
other step. At each iteration, there can be a change in the
requirements towards the system in the form of either a new
feature or a modification of an existing one.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVACY ENGINEERING
METHODOLOGIES AND STANDARDS
There is no doubt that the shift towards using services and
agile methods facilitates the deployment of novel software-
based products. While these approaches lower development
and deployment costs, they also impose constraints on dif-
ferent aspects of software development that challenge the
practices described in methodologies and standards that focus
on engineering privacy by design.
A. Challenges
We first identify three challenges that the agile and services
shift in software engineering practices described in the previ-
ous Section II raises for methodological works and proposals
for engineering privacy by design. A few recent studies show
the impediments that software developers experience and/or
express towards adopting privacy engineering methodologies
in their work [48], [86], [87], [94]. Prominently, incompati-
bility between privacy engineering methodologies and usual
development processes and a lack of demonstrable use are
considered to be an obstacle to the adoption of privacy
engineering methods [86], [87]. We analyze what privacy
engineering methodological works face in the current agile
and services software development practices and we identify
the following challenges.
Challenge 1 - Dealing with services. In service-oriented
architectures, systems become a composition of services. In
principle, this is possibly a favorable environment for pri-
vacy. It may diminish the privacy risks by partitioning the
data collection, processing, and storage, and facilitating the
implementation of privacy mechanisms tailored to the service.
In reality, however, services may be an obstacle to engineer
privacy by design.
First, the use of standalone services reduces development
complexity by limiting the scope of what is to be done (i.e.,
‘do one thing well’). However, it also increases the complexity
of achieving privacy because privacy compositions are far from
trivial (see Section IV). Services may either not provide any
privacy protection, or include service-specific protections [1],
[5]. Privacy engineering methods must acknowledge this dif-
ficulty and provide means and guidance to evaluate privacy of
compositions of services, not only privacy of a systems under
full end-to-end control of a single team.
Second, some services are provided by (untrusted) third
parties or include connections to other third-party services,
e.g., IP geo-location APIs [7], mapping [4], or face recogni-
tion [10]. This service-oriented philosophy is becoming also
typical inside organizations to enable teams to work indepen-
dently, only exposing APIs to each other [91]. This implicit
inclusion of information flows to other entities or teams that
are not under the control of the system engineer raises privacy
concerns that do not exist when the system is implemented
as a monolith. Privacy engineering methodologies need to
include explicit steps to identify these flows, analyze them,
and implement adequate protections. The latter step, however,
may be hindered by the distributed modularized nature of the
system.
Third, whether they are developed in-house or by third
parties, services are typically developed by different teams.
Services expose the APIs in their specification to other ser-
vices, but hide the details of the implementation. This brings
advantages from a development perspective, as it decouples
the progress of different services and eases system updates for
performance, functionality, or even security. From a privacy
perspective, however, hiding the service’ internals interferes
with the overall privacy design and analysis, to the point
that it may make achieving end-to-end privacy practically
impossible. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that,
because these are developed in an iterative manner, they may
evolve asynchronously. Such changes have to be accounted
for by other services, possibly requiring new privacy solutions
or changes in the existing ones. To address these issues,
privacy engineering methodologies must incorporate steps to
think about privacy requirements and solutions in pieces and
increments.
Use case. Recall the privacy-preserving billing example in
Figure 1. In the monolith solution (left), the system is
not-trusted and protecting the users’ privacy requires the use
of privacy technologies [20], [52], [58], [80], [101]. The
introduction of services (center and right) changes the threat
model, as now one has to take into account if the compute
and store services are trusted. In other words, the use
of services introduces new information flows with a privacy
impact.
To address this impact, the services may implement pri-
vacy technologies: compute may offer privacy-preserving
computations and store may provide database encryption.
However, the mere fact of making calls to these services can
leak, for instance, the number of clients. This means that when
services are added, one has different privacy guarantees than
in the monolith scenario where only the system had informa-
tion about the users. This very simple analysis highlights that
once services are in place one has to conduct a new privacy
analysis that must take into account the composition of flows
and protection mechanisms in the system.
To illustrate the problems arising from independent evo-
lution, assume that in order to hide the number of clients,
the development team would implement an obfuscation
mechanism to hide the number of queries sent to compute
and store. To compute the obfuscation rate, the team used
version v1 of the services. After some time these services
change their implementation becoming slower and handling
less requests per minute (e.g., they migrate to a cheaper cloud
plan). Even though neither the specification, nor the API
of the services changes, the system is impacted: either it
reduces the overall throughput to keep the protection level,
or reduces the obfuscation rate decreasing the effectiveness of
the mechanism.
Challenge 2 - Minimizing trust assumptions. The most
elusive of all challenges is how to deal with the intrinsic
tension between the conception of trust in service-oriented-
design and privacy-by-design paradigms. In service-oriented
design software developers can, and should, use the services
created by others and focus on adding value (in the form of
code) where their enterprises specialize. This saves resources
(time and money) and minimizes the operational risk for the
enterprise. This paradigm implies that developers trust these
service to adequately handle data and protect privacy.
In privacy engineering, developers assume that the risk
comes from trusting outside parties to carry out services and
thus select architectures, data flows, and privacy-preserving
mechanisms to minimize this risk [46]. In other words, devel-
opers seek to reduce trust in other parties to hold and protect
data. Privacy engineering methodologies need to explicitly
acknowledge this clash between paradigms, and provide guide-
lines as to how to reconcile these goals.
Use case. When introducing services to reduce costs, the
enterprise who provides the system also externalizes the
privacy risks associated to the clients’ data collection and
processing. Effectively, this means that the enterprise has
increased its trust in compute and store. In Figure 1, right,
the trust goes as far as to not see the flow of the address
between the compute and store and to trust compute
with sending the bill. Under the privacy engineering paradigm,
however, a main goal is to reduce the amount of trust put on
others by controlling sensitive data flows. Reconciling these
two objectives raises the question of how to use services with
minimal trust. A possible path is to implement more privacy
technologies, but that increases the problems associated with
challenge 1.
Challenge 3 - Supporting development activities. Introduc-
ing privacy-preserving technologies into software systems hin-
ders the realization of a number of fundamental development
activities, e.g., debugging and testing. In a monolithic design,
these activities can be carried out prior to deployment and
do not need to use production data. When iterative design
and services are in place, both debugging and testing typically
require the use of data collected under deployment. These data
may not be available because of the privacy protections. Thus,
privacy engineering must include alternative means to carry
out these activities when privacy protections are in place.
We note that these obstacles become even harder to over-
come when debugging or testing concern a privacy function-
ality. In this case, it is likely that the data to perform the task
is not available pre-deployment, e.g., setting up parameters to
privately training a machine learning model on a population
that has an unknown distribution, and thus cannot be used
for testing. This problem is intrinsic to the very nature of the
privacy solution. As such, it may be that it is not possible to
enhance privacy engineering to deal with these situations.
Use case. Introducing more PETs to account for the intro-
duction of untrusted services, also increases the difficulty to
debug and maintain systems. For instance, adding obfuscating
communications with the compute provider can hinder the
debugging of billing computation; the dummy traffic will
obfuscate the correct behavior of the external service for the
system too.
B. Engineering Practices in Privacy by Design Methodologies
and Standards
Next, we present our analysis of the privacy engineering
methodologies literature with regards to what extent it covers
the identified challenges. Privacy engineering methodologies
are works (frameworks, theories, methods, models, processes,
technologies and tools) that are meant to aid developers
to engineer privacy-preserving software. We selected papers
whose focus is to support the engineering of privacy by design
though yet their perspectives differ: certain are focused on
risk assessment and threat modeling, others on requirements
engineering, and few on software engineering. The field of
privacy engineering methodologies is new and limited to only
a handful of established works that we started from. We
extended the set of papers by following their references until
we could not find further studies within the scope of our
analysis as well as from a broader search through literature
that investigates the perceptions of developers towards privacy
engineering (methodologies). We also study relevant privacy-
engineering standards because of their potential impact on
industry practices regarding privacy.
We excluded from our analysis non-peer-reviewed literature
such as books, white papers, grey literature1. We acknowledge
that some of these sources can be informative, especially
about the state of practice in industry. However, they focus
predominantly on niche markets of practitioners, on specific
technologies, and data protection compliance, thus, are out
1Grey literature refers to literature produced outside of usual academic or
commercial publication channels such as reports, working papers, etc.
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF ENGINEERING PRIVACY BY DESIGN METHODOLOGY CONTRIBUTIONS. ENCODING: #: THE WORK DOES NOT CONSIDER OR PRESENT THIS
DIMENSION, H#: THE WORK MENTIONS THIS DIMENSION BUT DOES NOT CENTER AROUND IT,  : THE WORK REVOLVES AROUND AND ANALYZES IN
DETAIL THIS DIMENSION.
Heuristics Prescriptive Mappingto PETs
Risks/
threats
Goal-
oriented
Academic publications
Hoepman [51]  H#  # #
Deng et al. [39] #    #
Spiekermann and Cranor [93] #  # # #
De Metayer [36] #  #  #
Hansen et al. [49] #  # # H#
Gu¨rses et al. [45], [46]  #   #
Al-Momani et al. [17] H# # # # #
Bernsmed [24] #  # # #
Liu et al. [65] # # # #  
Kalloniatis et al. [57] H#   #  
Kung [62] #  # # #
Danezis et al. [35]  H#  H# #
Standards
ISO/IEC TR 27550 [15] H# #  H#  
OASIS PMRM [13] #  # H# #
OASIS [28] #  #  #
NISTIR 8062 [14] # H# #  #
PRIPARE [73] #  #   
of scope for our analysis. We also excluded works that
focus only on threat modeling and risk analysis as these are
complementary to engineering activities (could be a subset)
but are not sufficient as an engineering methodology.
Type of methodological contribution. We first classify the
works according to their methodological contribution (see
Table I). We consider the following categories:
– Heuristics & Thinking processes: The methodology pro-
vides guidelines for developers regarding how to reason
about privacy and privacy design.
– Prescriptive: The methodology is a checklist, a taxonomy,
or a reference model. The users of the methodology have
to fit their case in the listed “privacy” cases.
– Mapping to PETs: The methodology provides a map-
ping from privacy principles, best practices, activities,
objectives, or strategies to one or more PETs suitable
to implement them.
– Risk assessment/Threat modeling: The methodology is
a framework for analyzing privacy risks or for doing
privacy-oriented threat modeling.
– Goal-oriented: The methodology is focused on eliciting
requirements to achieve privacy goals.
Our study highlights that methodology-oriented works
rarely include guidelines on how to engineer privacy as a
software engineering practice. Most of the contributions in
the literature are prescriptive, with few actionable guidelines
for developers who would like to use PETs in their projects.
Those that provide heuristics take mainly two perspectives.
Hoepman [51] shows how to reason about privacy starting
from a known software engineering concept – design patterns
– and extending it with privacy strategies and patterns that
achieve a given privacy property. Gu¨rses et al. [45], [46]
provide a design process in which the central point for the
system-to-be-engineered is minimizing trust on entities other
than the data subject. This implicitly leads to the minimization
of data that needs to leave the trusted domain, providing a way
for developers to reason about the boundaries of the system as
well as computational methods to achieve the same outcome
with less data being shared with third parties.
The few papers that offer mappings to PETs [51], [39], [57],
[35] use a top-down approach. The methods start from high-
level concepts (principles in the case of Hoepman’s work [51]
or abstract goals in the case of Kalloniatis et al. [57]) and
go through multiple steps of transformation and refinement
map to PETs to analyze and design the system and prescribe
a way of working (a method or a process) that have to be
followed closely irrespective of any software development
practices. For instance, in the case study illustrating the use
of the PriS method unlinkability is presented as a privacy
goal, whereas “ensure the participation of all eligible voters”
is an organizational goal refined into multiple subgoals that
are analyzed in relation to the unlinkability privacy goal;
the privacy goals are also labeled as privacy patterns that
map to techniques to implement them (unlinkability relates
to, for instance, onion routing). The goals (i.e., “ensure the
participation of all eligible voters”) are disconnected from any
privacy technology (i.e., onion routing) thought multiple non-
trivial steps (organizational subgoals, privacy goals, privacy
patterns) that have to be followed closely, and thus difficult
to tailor to individual needs in custom development processes
(also acknowledged in PriS [57]).
The limitations above are transposed into standards. The
standards are driven by a collaboration between a subset of
the broader academic community, governmental bodies, and
enterprises, and typically stress on minimizing risks for enter-
prises. In particular, we find that the threats considered in these
standards (as well as the work by De and Le Metayer [36])
are typically organizational, e.g., ISO/IEC TR 27550 relates
to the work of Deng et al. for privacy threat modeling and
lists for example, “policy and consent noncompliance” as
a threat to be addressed [39]. As such, they correspond to
adversarial models that do not match the adversarial (threat)
models considered in academic papers on privacy technologies
(such as those revised in Section IV-B) which focus on risks
associated with information leaked by technology vis a vis
adversaries (including to the system providers). Therefore, it
is difficult for developers to integrate PETs when following
these standards, as they fulfill different objectives than the
ones set up in the threat models prescribed in standards. In
fact, standards rarely mention PETs, and when they do so it
is on a use-case basis with few handlers for developers to
extrapolate the solutions to further scenarios.
Addressing the challenges. Next, we evaluate the extent to
which these methodologies address the challenges that the
introduction of agile and services pose. We evaluate the works
according to the following criteria, which reflect the challenges
we identified in the beginning of the section (Table II summa-
rizes our analysis).
• Addressing services. We consider five dimensions that
methodologies need to address. (1) Architecture, what
architecture does the methodology assume? a monolith
(a single codebase with no modularity and no coordina-
tion with external entities), service-oriented (a traditional
service-oriented architecture) or a hybrid (the methodol-
ogy mentions services but the architecture is not assumed
to be service-oriented). (2) Development process, does the
methodology assume (implicitly or explicitly) a certain
type of development process for the engineering of the
software? (3) Integration, does the methodology propose
guidelines for integrating services together? (4) Changes
and new features, does the methodology consider and/or
provide a way for engineers to reason about changes in
the system? (5) Evaluation, does the methodology address
the evaluation step, and in particular does it acknowledge
the difficulty of carrying out a privacy analysis when
PETs and threat models of different services need to be
combined?
• Addressing the shift in trust assumptions is reflected in
two dimensions. (1) Context of use, the methodology
inspects and provides ways to reason about the contextual
dependencies between services: which part of the system
is responsible for what part of the execution logic and
which data flows. In this dimension, we also distinguish
between the context that service-oriented systems exist
in (technical settings for the engineering systems with
services) and the non-technical organizational context
of use of information systems. Methodologies that fo-
cus on the organizational context might be more inline
with contextual integrity [72]. (2) Data minimization,
the methodology addresses data minimization as a prime
system design principle by looking at ways how to fulfill
functionality in a way that minimizes the need to trust
other parties or a single party, with the protection of
data [46].
• Addressing development activities. We consider whether
the methodology acknowledges that privacy engineering
has to accommodate development activities (such as
debugging, testing, continuous integration) beyond the
pure design decisions and implementation of protections
in a system. Or, does the methodology provide support
for developers to perform development activities while
preserving the privacy properties of the system?
Academic publications. Regarding services, we observe that
66% of the academic publications assume that the system is
a monolith controlled by one entity, and the remaining works
only mention services but do not really consider modularity
or flows between entities. For instance, Spiekermann and
Cranor [93] discuss services, from the point of view of the
user: the system provides a service to the user. Their work
assumes that the service provider have full control over the
functionality and implementation of the service. Similarly,
other works that introduce the service notion [24], [36], [49]
focus on the user perspective, which is far from the principles
underlying service-oriented architectures, e.g., modularity or
reliance on third party service providers.
We find a similar breakdown in terms of development
process, 75% implicitly or explicitly assume waterfall method-
ology in which design is made up front and never changes,
and the others do mention iterative development although
they do not explicitly address the challenges that arise from
that change. In fact, only the work by Danezis et al. [35]
acknowledges explicitly that how to deal with changes in the
development process is an open question. Interestingly, there
seems not to be a clear pattern that matches architecture and
development process, which highlights the disconnection with
respect to current software development practices where those
go hand in hand.
The treatment of integration, changes, and evaluation is
scarce. Integration and changes are mostly ignored, even by
those works that acknowledge the existence of services or
iterative methodologies. The most sophisticated treatment of
integration is the requirement on privacy technologies to be
“integrable” and “compatible” by Al-Momani et al. [17]. How-
ever, integrable in this paper is not related to actual integration
of services but to whether the PET offers the functionality and
performance needed in the system. The example that illustrates
the notion of a non-integrable technology is a computationally-
heavy homomorphic scheme and how it cannot be integrated in
a time-critical application. This does not show impossibility
for integration but inappropriateness, hence, even this work
does not review the aspects of integration that are intrinsic
to service-oriented software. The last aspect, evaluation, is
mostly equated to a Privacy Impact Assessment [30], in which
TABLE II
CHALLENGES AND THE METHODOLOGIES. ENCODING: #: THE WORK DOES NOT CONSIDER OR PRESENT THIS DIMENSION, H#: THE WORK MENTIONS
THIS DIMENSION BUT DOES ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS.  : THE WORK REVOLVES AROUND AND ANALYZES IN DETAIL THIS DIMENSION.  : THE WORK
PROPOSES A NON-TECHNICAL SOLUTION TO THE DIMENSION.
SERVICES TRUST DEVELOPER
Architecture DevProcess Integration Changes Eval
Context
of use
Minimize
Data ACTIVITIES
Academic papers
Hoepman [51] monolith mentionsiterative # # # # H# #
Deng et al. [39] monolith waterfall # # # # # #
Spiekermann
and Cranor [93] hybrid waterfall # # # # H# #
PRIAM [36] hybrid waterfall # # # # H# #
Hansen et al. [49] hybrid waterfall # # # # H# #
Gu¨rses et al. [45], [46] monolith waterfall # # # #  #
Al-Momani et al. [17] monolith v-process2 H# # # # # #
Bernsmed [24] monolith waterfall # # # # # #
Liu et al. [65] monolith waterfall # # # # # #
Kalloniatis et al. [57] monolith waterfall # # # # # #
Kung [62] monolith waterfall # H# # # # H#
Danezis et al. [35] hybrid mentionsiterative H# # H# # H# #
Standards
ISO/IEC TR 27550 [15] services mentionsagile # # # # # #
OASIS PMRM [13] services waterfall # # # # # #
OASIS [28] services mentionsagile # # # # H# #
NISTIR 8062 [14] monolith waterfall # # # # # #
PRIPARE [73] monolith agile # # H# # # #
designers evaluate the impact of a privacy violation but they
do not quantify the likelihood of such violation given the
system specification. Evaluation, as understood in academic
papers on privacy technologies, is only explicitly mentioned by
Danezis et al. [35], where they point out that privacy evaluation
must be addressed, but they do not explain how nor mention
the difficulty behind composition of service-specific privacy
protections.
Our analysis indicates that development activities such as
testing, debugging, continuous integration are ignored across
the board. Kung [62] mentions tangentially that there are
tactics on the software architecture level that can be employed
to achieve “modifiability” and “testability” among other prop-
erties. As he proposes a software architectural solution for
privacy engineering, we could interpret that the existing tactics
are compatible with the privacy tactics posed in the work.
Yet, there is no stated relation between and analysis of the
combination of the two.
Finally, regarding minimizing the trust put in any single
party, a few works do explicitly mention the system’s context.
However, this context is the settings of the organization not
the notion of context of a software system. For instance, Liu et
al. [65] model the organizational context through actors and
their goals. Data minimization, on the other hand, is often
2Considered an extension of waterfall. The v-process bends the activities
upwards after coding to show the relationship between steps.
mentioned [46], [45], [51], [93], [49], but it is central only to
the methodology proposed by Gu¨rses et al. [45], [46]. It is,
however, only their later work that presents and expands on the
concept of trust minimization as pivotal in privacy-preserving
systems design [46].
Standards. We observe a different trend on standards than
on academic works. The majority of standards acknowledges
the existence of services, in the service-oriented architectures
sense, and some of them do consider integration and changes.
In particular, ISO/IEC TR 27550 [15] provides a detailed
account how to manage the relationship with subsystem
providers and that the expectations and contractual obligations
between the users and the main system provider should extend
to the subsystems. This recommendation is a clear sign of
service-oriented architectures being taken under consideration,
yet, the focus remains on contractual issues such as defining
liability and responsibility. The standard stops there and does
not tackle the complexities arising from services and privacy
integration, and hence, the challenges we raise in this section.
Notably, the standards we reviewed center around the con-
text of use of an IT system and place the analysis and design of
this context in the heart of the standards. However, standards
are primarily concerned with the organizational aspect of IT
and how IT is integrated and standardized within this organiza-
tional context. This organizational focus limits the scope and
purpose of standards to high-level general recommendations
and instructions on conducting privacy engineering within the
organizational context. The implications of the software devel-
opment process together with the services architecture could
be interpreted as too specific to be included in standards; after
all standards are industry-wide documents which should be
applicable regardless of the type of the software development
process employed or the software architecture type. Yet, in
omitting these specificities, the standards also fail to address
the challenges that the predominant software development
process (agile) and software architecture (service-oriented)
pose to the actual integration and engineering of privacy in
systems.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVACY ENHANCING
TECHNOLOGIES
The shift to iterative software engineering and the reliance
on services pose challenges not only to the privacy engineering
methodologies but also to the design of privacy enhancing
technologies.
A. Challenges
We now describe challenges and discuss whether their origin
is the use of agile or the use of services.
Challenge 1 - Changing requirements. In an agile software
development, the specification of the system is never assumed
to be final. At every iteration there can be a change in the target
functionality, the amount or type of data that is processed, or
in the services used in the system. Such changes effectively
result in a new system specification. PETs designers will have
to account in their designs that a change can, and inevitably,
will occur during the development of the overall system. The
system specification change might result in a change of the
threat model, the requested privacy protection, the requested
functionality (new, removed, reduced or enhanced), or the way
the privacy-preserving functionality is carried out.
Use case. Recall the privacy-preserving billing example in
Figure 1. Assume that the customer buying the system requests
a change in functionality: add a new feature to the bill
computation (e.g., a time slot, a per-client premium, or new
data collection). To implement these changes, one must change
the encrypted information, as well as any zero-knowledge
proof used to prove that the encryption is correct. These
changes, however, are far from trivial and may require a new
design from scratch.
Challenge 2 - Agnostic privacy protection without control.
Partitioning the execution logic and data flows of a monolithic
system into services means that the PETs that are integrated
in different parts of the service-oriented system will have a
limited overview of the context of the end-to-end system, thus,
the PETs designers do not have full control over system. The
next challenge for the PETs is to offer privacy protection to be
integrated with the different services without having control
over, or even knowing, the rest of the system (i.e., services
used, execution logic, data flows). Depending on the end-to-
end system, services may gather different types of data, for
different purposes, and be considered in different adversarial
roles. Therefore, the PETs that will have to provide protection
independently from the end-to-end system: the PETs can
guarantee only minimal limited protection. This problem is
exacerbated by the widespread use of certain services, e.g.,
OAuth-based login services [6], [11] or cloud-based Customer
Relationship Management software [9], [8]. By virtue of being
used in more than one context, these services have access
to unexpected data flows generating privacy, in particular
linkability, issues that are hard to foresee for both the service
and the end-to-end system designers who have only partial
visibility of the data flows. The PETs will have to be system-
agnostic. Meaning, the PETs will have to ignore the specific
data that are being gathered, the interaction between services,
the architecture of the application and its specificities, the
compositions of services and PETs. PETs are highly contextual
because they provide concrete privacy guarantees under a spe-
cific settings (thread model and deployment setup); deploying
PETs in service-oriented systems would require the PETs
to abstract these specificities and provide guarantees in an
agnostic to the end-to-end system way.
Use case. For example, in Figure 1, center and right, the
compute can be coupled with a PET that provides a guar-
antee that the premium is never seen in plain text outside of
the service. The moment the compute sends the premium
outside of its boundary, the privacy protection is outside of
the control of compute. Now consider the development team
behind the compute service (Figure 1, center). While they
are designing and implementing, they cannot be sure about
(i) which will be the requirements of the system (Challenge
1) and (ii) under which environment, i.e., with what other
services and under what configuration, will the module be
deployed. Therefore, the team cannot predict what other flows
there will be under deployment and implement the adequate
safeguards to ensure that the privacy guarantees provided by
the privacy-preserving computation are preserved regardless of
the environment.
For a PET to be integrated in a service, it usually means
it is weaved into the code of the service. In other words, the
PET and the service are not separated but one (for example, an
encrypted database). To allow for services to integrate PETs
more easily (the encryption), the PETs have to provide an
interface: the PETs designers need to abstract the details of
the implementation and generalize the cases in which the PET
will be used. The questions to address are many: what a
meaningful abstraction is, what the boundaries of the PET and
the service are, what functionality that the PET assumes, how
much to expose from its internals, how to be interoperable and
backward-compatible.
Use case. Now consider the development team behind
compute (Figure 1, center and right). In the first case, (Fig-
ure 1, center), the compute service receives as an input mi, a
measurement, and returns a premium. Whereas in the second
case, (Figure 1, right), the service assumes more functionality
and actively asks for data from the system: compute requests
the measurement mi after receiving an address, and sends a
bill, never exposing the premium to another service. These
two cases differ drastically in their threat models and context
that the services have access to. If compute has no privacy
properties to guarantee, it can expose two different entry points
for its users to decide which of the two cases they prefer.
However, in the case of a privacy-preserving computation, the
two scenarios might contradict each other’s threat model (in
the first case, the address and the premium are associated
by the system, in the second, the system never receives
either pieces of data).
Challenge 3 - Support composition. Building service-
oriented systems would mean that more than one PET are
likely to co-exist. However, PETs are typically designed and
evaluated to provide a given privacy protection in one specific
system setup. A PET designer would have to anticipate the
need for composition and evaluation of compositions of PETs
with other PETs and traditional services. This means that the
designers would have to make use of privacy definitions and
adversarial models that can be composed and that provide
grounds for evaluation of the privacy guarantees of the end-
to-end system.
Use case. Even if it is the overall system designer responsi-
bility to make sure that when integrating services they do not
reduce each others’ protection, this can only be done if the
PETs implemented in those services can be composed. For
instance, assume that the store service permits retrieving
records under oblivious transfer. If the oblivious transfer and
the homomorphic billing do not share a threat model, studying
the composition is hard. An open question is whether it
is possible to generalize and to express threat models and
consequently privacy and security definitions that can be
composed and evaluated.
Challenge 4 - Developers activities for and with PETs.
Besides core design and evaluation tasks discussed in the
previous challenges, system development and deployment en-
tails other activities to ensure, among others, correct operation
(e.g., functionality testing) or adequate performance (e.g,
collection of usage statistics). These practices introduce new
requirements for PETs. For instance, PETs that are integrated
in a service may be obfuscating the data flows, encrypting the
data, introducing noise, etc. to provide privacy protection to
the service. These techniques will transform the PETs into a
near black-box for the developer who integrates it with their
service as the behavior of the service will be altered by the
PET and the developer will not be able to inspect the inner
workings to detect malfunctions or incorrect use. The PETs
designers need to account for reproducibility, traceability,
rigorous behavior specification to enable the developers to
integrate PETs without disrupting usual developers activities.
PET designers will need to come up with creative novel and
certainly non-trivial ways to ensure testing of functionality and
reproducibility.
Other development activities are associated with DevOps
practices. An example are the uses of canary testing and dark
launches in which different versions of the software co-exist
for functionality or performance testing. These technologies
change flows and introduce unforeseen flows which are never
considered by PETs designers. This hinders PETs deployment
as they can not support modern deployment needs.
Use case. In our privacy-preserving billing running exam-
ple, for instance, the system team needs to know that
the compute service performs up to expectations: that the
premium is computed correctly. Yet, if the premium in-
tegrates a PET that encrypts the value, then the PET de-
signer will have to provide additional mechanisms to prove
the operation was correct. This can be achieved with, for
example, a zero-knowledge proof but this is in no way trivial
or straightforward to implement (by the PETs designers) or
integrate (by the compute developers).
B. Engineering Practices in Privacy Technologies Research
In this section, we study whether researchers working on
PETs and privacy-preserving systems address the challenges
in the previous sections and if they do so, how.
Paper selection. We conducted a systematic literature review
of privacy-related papers. We selected these papers by revising
the programs of three top conferences: IEEE S&P, USENIX
Security, NDSS between 2015 and 2019. We identified 118
papers (33 from IEEE S&P, 41 from USENIX Security, and
44 from NDSS). The selection comprises papers presented in
privacy-oriented sessions, as well as other papers that advance
the state of the art on privacy. We did not consider papers
that propose, improve, or analyze cryptographic primitives or
their implementation unless the authors presented them in the
context of a clear privacy application. We also excluded from
our study papers focusing on privacy policies (see Section V).
We performed a cursory review of privacy-related papers from
ACM CCS and PETS. Our sample confirmed that the papers
published in those two venues fare similarly to the other papers
that we study against the challenges. Therefore, we stopped
our papers sampling because our analysis reached a saturation
point: (1) increasing the volume of papers included in the
analysis did not bring further insights about the treatment of
agile and services in the PETs-oriented literature; and (2) the
percentages presented in the remainder of the section remained
similar even if the absolute numbers increase.
Nature of the contribution. We study the type of contribution
these papers make as building blocks that can be used for
privacy engineering. We consider five categories:
1) End-to-end systems: these are papers that propose a
complete system to solve a given problem in a privacy-
preserving way (e.g., messaging [34], ride-hailing ser-
vices [77], or credit networks [66]). These papers con-
sider the complete ‘development cycle’, eliciting require-
ments, designing an end-to-end solution, implementing
it, and performing an evaluation of its privacy properties
and the overhead these impose.
2) Components: these are papers that propose a component
that enhances privacy for one particular functionality
(e.g., a measuring unit [54], [67], traffic obfuscator [99],
or search [71]). These components can be integrated in
systems to enhance privacy.
3) Protocol: these are papers that propose a protocol or an
algorithm that enhances privacy, but cannot do this all on
its own [100], [18].
4) Evaluations/Analysis/Attacks: these are papers that do not
provide new privacy-preserving functionalities, but con-
duct evaluations to test the privacy of existing systems,
components or protocols [78], [84], [97].
We assign papers to one or more categories (e.g., papers
that propose end-to-end systems may also introduce reusable
components). We end up with 18 end-to-end systems, 40
components, 20 protocols, 77 evaluations and attacks. Group-
ing these, we obtain 78 papers focused on design (end-to-
end, components, and protocols) and 77 evaluation-oriented.
In other words, 50% of the privacy work at top privacy
conferences focuses on attacks and evaluations of systems.
While this helps increasing security, privacy, and transparency
on academic and deployed systems, it brings little value to the
privacy engineering discipline.
Consideration of engineering aspects. We look at engi-
neering aspects that are key for the integration of privacy
technologies in contemporary software development pipelines.
We consider the following aspects:
• Systematization: The paper reviews a (part
of) the literature and provides an organiza-
tion/comparison/systematization (e.g., a taxonomy,
a hierarchy, a mapping to the attack/design space) that
would help engineers to identify solutions [55], [79],
[95].
• Generalization: The paper makes an effort to generalize
the use of the proposed techniques beyond one or two
use cases [42], [63], [70].
• Sets best practices: The paper indicates steps that should
be taken to best design/evaluate a system [22], [92], [97].
• Frameworks: The paper proposes a guidelines that can be
followed when designing, implementing, or evaluating a
system to reproduce the steps taken by the authors should
the environment, adversarial model, or other aspects,
change [55], [63], [68].
• Reference code/artifact: The authors have made reference
code available. (We do not test whether the code runs or
whether the results are reproducible).
• Considers context and integration: The paper speaks
about the environment where the component/protocol will
be deployed [38], [69].
• Considers changes: The paper considers that the require-
ments, components, services, or environment may change
over time and discusses how these changes will affect the
design and its properties [26], [50].
In terms of laying out the research space around privacy
technologies, we find that only 15 (12%) papers provide some
sort of systematization, and 41 (21%) elaborate on general-
ization beyond demonstrating effectiveness for the proposed
methods in one or two concrete use cases. We obtain a similar
result when looking for descriptions of the process followed by
the authors. Only 15 provide a framework to guide engineers
to tackle similar problems, and only 32 (20%) establish best
practices that can be followed by engineers to provide strong
privacy protection in their systems.
Among the 118 papers, 56 (47%) provide reference code
or an artifact associated with the research. However, only
23 of these 56 correspond to protocols and components. The
remaining 33 correspond to an attack or an evaluation.
If we look at agile and service-oriented aspects such as
consideration of context and changes, the results are even
more discouraging. Only 23 (19%) papers explicitly mention
the environment in which technologies could be deployed;
and only 13 (11%) papers consider that this environment may
change over time (and these sets have two papers in common).
When we consider papers that propose components, which
by definition are to be integrated in larger systems and thus
should be more cognizant of environmental conditions, the re-
sults improve but are still far from ideal. Out of 40 components
10 (25%) explicitly mention the context where they would
be deployed, but only 3 (7.5%) are aware that this context
may evolve over time. We found only six evaluation-oriented
papers that consider context and only one explicitly address
changes. This means that while these papers represent 50%
of the academic output, they focus on snapshots of systems
and their broader applicability in software engineering is in
question.
The most discouraging result is that 44 (37%) of the papers
we survey do not mention any of the considered engineering
factors. This includes 18 papers that do provide reference code
but do not discuss how this code may be integrated in software
engineering practices.
V. SCOPE
The purpose of this paper is to formulate and analyze sys-
tematically the challenges that software engineering practices
pose to privacy engineering, hence we focus on proposals
for privacy technology design and privacy engineering. Re-
garding privacy technologies (PETs) we covered theoretical
and practice-oriented research that engages in architecture,
protocol, or component design that achieve desired function-
alities in a privacy-preserving manner. PETs are technolo-
gies that protect the opacity of the individual when using
information services. PETs consider entities that collect and
process data to be a single point of failure for privacy and
propose designs intended to reduce the dependency on this
centralized entities. To achieve this, privacy designs propose
server-side solutions, i.e., deployed by the service provider
such as homomorphic encryption; client-side solutions, i.e.,
deployed by the user to protect their interactions with service
providers such as anonymous communications; and collabo-
rative solutions in which data and computation are distributed
among the users such as peer-to-peer file sharing [40]. All
these designs aspire to minimize the privacy risks associated
with data collection and processing by minimizing collection,
replication, linkability, and centralization of user data when
building systems. We considered privacy technology design
approaches that have data and risk minimization core to their
proposal. Regarding privacy engineering, we covered research
and practical guidance on methods, techniques, and tools that
aid in engineering systems that integrate privacy technologies
into systems to enhance privacy protection [85]. We focused
on the technical feasibility of the proposed designs and on
the actionability of the methodologies in current day software
development environments and not on the appropriateness of
these approaches for current day privacy needs.
There are other proposals for privacy technology design
and engineering that we left out of our study of this paper.
First, we did not consider information accountability tools
developed to support data protection compliance. In addition
to limiting data collection, data protection laws are about the
transparency and accountability of organizations that collect
and process personal data. The EU General Data Protection
Regulation [31], for example, lists a number of principles
intended to make organizations that collect and process per-
sonal data accountable by making these activities transparent
towards data subjects, regulators, and the greater public. These
requirements can translate to data lifecycle management tools
that enable the formalization of privacy policies [27] or ensure
purpose-based access control [76]. Other works propose ways
to improve transparency requirements like data subject access
requests and data portability. These proposals typically assume
a trusted service provider and so far lack normative assertions
with respect to data minimization in the original design of the
service. These works are valuable for the the fulfillment of
broader data protection requirements, but are complementary
to the privacy engineering methods and privacy designs we
considered.
Second, we did not cover research on the usability for users
of privacy functionality, anywhere from the accessibility of
privacy policies [83] to expressiveness of privacy settings [64].
This research is extremely valuable for the success and eval-
uation of privacy technology designs and merits expertise and
analysis beyond the limits of this paper. Third, we do not cover
usability of security and privacy for developers, e.g., how they
can use privacy preserving functionality, or how teams can
be organized to manage implementation and deployment of
security and privacy functionality [16]. This line of research is
deeply engaged in current day software engineering practices,
yet it focuses on another level of abstraction: they look at de-
velopers’ daily practices and usability of privacy and security
functionality for developers. This research is thus orthogonal
to our focus on the specification, design and implementation
of privacy functionality, considering human factors as one
dimension in our concerns.
VI. DISCUSSION
Proposals for privacy design and engineering fall short on
many aspects that are essential to current software engineering
practices. In the following, we discuss the underlying gaps, and
list challenges that need to be addressed to reconcile privacy
and software engineering practices. We note that although
these challenges have strong technical components, they are
potentially impossible to address using technical means only,
requiring academics, practitioners, regulators as well as the
software industry to revisit current practices.
A. Mind the Gaps
The Computer Science and Engineering Schism. Computer
science researchers propose designs and methodologies that
often abstract away engineering aspects with the ideal of
presenting results that are valid independent of the material
conditions of production or engineering. Abstraction is one
path to identifying designs and methodologies that are more
generalizable. Moreover, researchers like to explore novel
ways of doing things, rather than constraining themselves to
current industry practices. For example, most PETs aspire for
solutions that avoid the dominant political economy in current
software industries which relies on extractive models of data
collection at the cost of privacy.
The desire to be compatible with current software engineer-
ing practices can be difficult and at times counterproductive.
Fundamental research may require a different speed than the
industry, simply making it difficult to keep up with changes in
the software industry. Companies may keep their engineering
practices and privacy challenges secret. Finally, developers and
engineers may feel better equipped to figure out how to best
implement proposed designs in their working environments.
This makes the ideal cut off in specificity of a privacy
engineering methodology an interesting matter to study.
All these justifications aside, we show that the gap between
privacy engineering solutions and actual software engineer-
ing practice also exists because research proposals assume
monolithic designs and waterfall methods as the mode of
software production. The abstractions used in research works
hold certain assumptions about how software is produced [25].
The papers included in our study do not address challenges as-
sociated with the very nature of how software looks like and is
developed. Applying solutions that are disconnected from the
agile and service-oriented nature of software, leaves too wide
a gap for software developers to close. Privacy engineering
in the context of services, requirements and implementation
evolution, changing trust models and environments, supporting
developer activities, and multiple contexts of use is far from
trivial and still not a solely engineering task that developers
are able to perform without fundamental research in the area.
These gaps raise challenges to the operationalization of the
proposed designs and methods, but also open up new research
questions.
Silos across sub-disciplines. Some of these implicit assump-
tions could be surfaced through greater cooperation across
sub-disciplines in computer science. In particular, researchers
working on privacy designs and engineering may benefit
from collaborations with researchers in software engineering.
However, currently, these communities rarely overlap and have
different conceptions of privacy and the solution space. For
example, in the software engineering field, researchers have
studied engineers’ perception of privacy (cf. [48], [93]) and
requirements engineering for privacy (cf. [19], [90]. Others
have focused on information accountability, e.g., on translating
legal documents to requirements (cf. [27]) and the effect of
regulations on systems, discovering that high-level compliance
is hard to translate into technical requirements [88], [89].
The software engineering research field holds certain implicit
beliefs – the same way privacy engineering holds waterfall
and monolithic architectures – about privacy and about how
systems are engineered. Privacy in these works usually remains
on the level of data protection laws and challenges to comply
with the law in technical designs. Moreover, as the mode of
agile and service-orientated architectures is adopted through-
out software engineering field, the modus operandi is that this
is the way software is engineered; hence, software engineering
research holds agile and services as implicit beliefs and does
not consider the implications for privacy engineering not
operating under the same assumptions. A convergence between
these fields may enrich methods and help develop privacy
engineering methodologies and designs fit for modern software
engineering .
Standards amidst many currents. Current efforts in stan-
dardization suffer from the same limitations as academic
works. For example, the stages in the life cycle are described
in standards in terms of a purpose and outcomes, e.g. “Ver-
ification and validation documentation” in the development
phase, or “Quality assured systems-of-interest accepted by the
acquirer” in the production phase. Both examples implicitly
assume that there is a testing activity going on. However, the
description of this activity is hard to map back to practice. For
instance, development verification documentation may refer to
the test themselves or their results; and quality-assurance pro-
vides no guidance regarding when or how this test should be
performed. In contrast, current practices perform continuous
testing both under development and production. Furthermore,
ideally, standardization should come after a technology is
mature enough [98]. Given the gaps between computer science
and actual engineering practice, current efforts may standard-
ize misaligned approaches, leading to a missed opportunity for
an industry wide change.
B. The Elephant in the Room: The Agile Turn as a Problem
The challenges that services and agile methods poses are
difficult and beg the question whether something has to change
in the way we produce software in order for privacy engineer-
ing to be feasible in the first place. There is little to excuse for
privacy researchers’ lack of attention to software engineering
practice, but any further efforts need to also consider how
current software industry practices have to change.
Most importantly, it is possible to argue that service archi-
tectures and agile development methodologies have become
the source of many privacy problems. Privacy research gener-
ally, and web measurement more specifically, has typically
looked at advertising as the main driver for privacy intru-
sive development practices [16], [43], [96], [103]. From our
vantage point, the irruption of software in the advertisement
industry, and in particular the tools to enable massive tracking
can be depicted as the first successful scalable product of
service architectures.
Potentially, the advertisement tracking ecosystem can be
considered an example of the greater developments in soft-
ware production. The capability to continuously tap on user
interactions as feedback, combined with agile development
methods, enable unprecedented optimization of systems [61].
This feedback is key for customer and user-centric develop-
ment, continuous delivery, and rapid integration of third party
services. These practices are not just steps in development
methodologies that can be changed, but are baked into devel-
opment environments, tools and cloud service offerings.
The distributed architecture underlying services, combined
with data-centric development methods and environments,
ends up multiplying privacy risks. In privacy literature, dis-
tributed systems are posited as a way to decentralize data,
computation and therewith power asymmetries. However, in
service architectures user data captured by one service is often
shared with all the others. Companies small and large inherit
these practices every time they plug into service ecosystems.
These ecosystems are economically attractive for lean startups
that want to test minimal viable products and for industry play-
ers that want to minimize risk while pivoting business models.
Data-centric development practices using current service archi-
tectures means that privacy risks are abound regardless of the
size of the company or the application domain.
Service ecosystems and cloud infrastructures disadvantage
organizations that want to use privacy designs and method-
ologies. Privacy design and methodologies, by design, limit
the way in which the advantages of service ecosystems can be
leveraged. For example, let us assume a company is committed
to applying privacy engineering, embedding PETs in their de-
sign, and pursuing a different business model. Their developer
teams will have to rely on non-standard software practices.
This will require software developers who are willing to work
without common toolsets and methodologies. Their users may
have to tolerate systems that may lack some of the “seamless”
experiences of data-centric designs. Investors will have to be
dedicated to support such efforts. Setting up such a company,
or bootstrapping privacy preserving development environments
may turn out to be an uphill battle.
The diametrically opposed use of the same terminology
in the software industry and privacy approaches surfaces the
tensions that are at play here. Ease of service composition
increases complexity in privacy composition; the extension of
trust to all third party service providers transforms services
from ‘single points of failure’ to ‘many points of failure’,
and externalizing business risk and costs comes at the cost
of increased privacy risks and engineering costs.
Finally, even if we could consolidate terminology, practices
and development environments, service architectures have
gone hand in hand with the centralization of data and com-
putation in the hands of a few dominant players like Google,
Microsoft, Facebook and Amazon, making privacy engineering
in this setting potentially ineffective. Some of these services
have deployed privacy preserving methods, e.g., differential
privacy. However, having access to immense amounts of data
and creating computational dependencies can yield tremen-
dous power, even when the data are processed by these entities
in a privacy-preserving manner [81]. The results of such
processing can have implications on society and democracy
that are far greater than matters of privacy, and therefore may
require political and economic interventions beyond privacy
engineering and associated technical solutions [59].
C. Steps forward
It is probably not surprising that the gap between theory
and practice raises many problems that seem intractable. The
problems we encounter, however, also provide many possibil-
ities both for research and change, some of which we discuss
next.
Structured agile. There are already many corrections of agile
practices that may provide opportunities for rethinking its
activities with an eye on privacy engineering. The introduction
of agile methods in organizations have not been without its
problems. These include difficulties in planning and complex-
ity as well as the cost of agile teams and use of third party
services. The responses to these problems can be thought in
terms of privacy design and engineering. For example:
• Proposals for structured agile: some actors have come to
make proposals for more structured agile. Efforts like this
may benefit from research into, for example, how much
planning is needed to enable privacy engineering?
• Proposals for scaled agile: Scaled agile are proposals
for large companies that have existing structures that
are siloed, exploring ways to introduce more coherence
among functions and departments. With scaled agile,
an organization coordinates between agile teams. Such
coordination may help in capturing information flows,
composition of privacy designs, enabling concerted pri-
vacy engineering practices, and also addressing questions
around trust. These activities may also help implement an
organization-wide privacy strategy.
Standardization:. Standards, if done right, hold the potential
to widely disseminate privacy engineering practices in the
industry. The closing of the gaps is likely possible through
standards that aspire to build a common vocabulary and to find
ways to integrate knowledge from researchers, practitioners
and legal experts [14]. A possible limitation is that standards
need to remain abstract enough to offer flexibility of imple-
mentation across industries and practices. Every organization
that obtains a standards certification tailors their practices to
comply with the standards requirements. Thus, no two ways
of complying with a standard are the same and standards have
to allow specificities in the implementation by remaining at a
higher abstraction level and introducing mainly principles to
be followed.
The limits and potentials of purpose limitation. One way
to mitigate the many challenges that agile practices in service
architectures pose to privacy design and methodologies is
through regulation. Very much like proposals coming from
privacy research, data protection laws promote minimizing
collection of data and restricting its use to a specific purpose,
although not necessarily technically.
Limiting data collection to a purpose only contractually
is not sufficient to curb the very broad data collection and
dissemination practices that services architectures and agile
development practices have normalized. In current software
development practices, once data are collected for a given
purpose, they can be fed into service architectures and used
in agile processes as long as it is done transparently. To
guarantee transparency, regulation promotes contractual obli-
gations encoded in terms of service or privacy policies. In
the end of the day, regulation does not encourage purpose
limitation at the technical implementation and thus software
developers rarely design software with this principle. It is
promising that regulators have recently started looking at pri-
vacy intrusive infrastructural designs from a purpose limitation
perspective. This is the case in a recent inquiry into Google
and IAB’s Real-Time Bidding standard [82], as well as the
recent complaint that Microsoft ProPlus telemetry data violates
data protection and in particular purpose limitation [32]. The
notion of purpose limitation has the potential to appeal to agile
teams that produce services because the existing metaphors in
the field are closely related. Limiting the scope of what is
done and how, through concepts such as bounded context and
doing one thing well, is at the heart of software engineering
practices. Introducing purpose limitation could potentially
ripple throughout the end-to-end designs and tie the legal
nature of purpose limitation to the technical implementation.
How data protection laws and software engineering methods
combined can better ensure data minimization is enforced in
service ecosystems is an interesting point of future inquiry.
Circling back to computer science and engineering.
The challenges above may determine the future of privacy
designs and privacy engineering. In the meantime some low-
hanging fruits can be addressed from a technical perspective:
1) Empirical and Measurement Research: Capture in depth
the challenges modularity, evolution, distributed trust and
novel development methods raise for privacy designs
and methodologies. Conduct empirical studies of current
software engineering practices with an eye on privacy
engineering, experiment with ways to introduce privacy
designs and engineering methods. Expand work on web
measurement from the current focus on advertisement to
study software infrastructures.
2) Design for agile and services: Explore PETs that can be
updated, that enable new encoding, or are composable.
Study different models of PET composition using and
going beyond service orchestration and choreography.
3) Support Developers: Consider ways in which current
software engineering practices can be done in a privacy
preserving manner: e.g., privacy preserving monitoring
of service environment. Introduce testing suits and eval-
uation methods for (composition in) PETs. Study and
mitigate privacy implications of developer activities like
dark launches, parallel development, continuous integra-
tion. Engage in ”brownfield” privacy engineering, i.e.,
retrofitting privacy into legacy systems in agile service
environments.
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